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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the effects of knowledge sharing or endogenous spillovers among R&D consortia 
participants on R&D competition when R&D enhances a firm's absorptive capacity. A game-theoretic 
model illustrates how different compositions of R&D consortia affect spillovers and R&D spending of 
participants. When a firm participates in a consortium whose members are from diverse industries, the 
model suggests that this participation increases spillover rates among participants and intensifies firms' 
R&D efforts to learn from other members in the consortium. An econometric analysis based on the 
panel data of 267 Japanese firms over 13 years shows evidence of this learning effect. 
Key words: R&D consortia, knowledge sharing, learning, absorptive capacity, spillovers 
JEL Classification: 031, 038, L52 
1. Introduction 
What are the effects of R&D cooperation on R&D efforts by cooperating firms? More 
specifically, under what circumstances does R&D cooperation stimulate R&D competition, reflected in the 
increase in firms' R&D spending? The purpose of this article is to evaluate the effect of R&D cooperation 
on the R&D expenditures of participating firms when R&D enhances a firm's absorptive capacity (which 
is defined here as a firm's ability to assimilate and exploit knowledge generated by other firms) by 
developing a game-theoretic model and conducting an empirical analysis of Japanese government-
sponsored R&D consortia. 
The focus of the article is on knowledge sharing or endogenous spillovers among R&D consortia 
participants, which are determined by the composition of R&D consortia. The results of this article 
suggest that when R&D consortia consist of firms with diverse technological knowledge, these firms bring 
knowledge-sharing opportunities, which result in higher spillover rates among participants and more 
intensified R&D efforts of participants to learn from other members of the consortia. In contrast, in the 
case of R&D consortia which consist of firms with similar technological capabilities, it is found that 
participating firms are more likely to cut their R&D expenditures. 
Cooperative R&D has been widely celebrated as a means of promoting private R&D, and some 
see it as a major tool for enhancing industry competitiveness.1 Possible benefits of cooperative R&D 
include cost and risk sharing among participants which allow them to execute large-scale projects, and 
knowledge sharing or learning of skills and capabilities from other participants. 
Japan is regarded as a forerunner in the practice of cooperative R&D. The most celebrated 
example is the VLSI (Very Large Scale Integrated circuit) project, designed to help Japan compete with 
the U.S. in semiconductor technology. The project, conducted between 1975 and 1985 with a budget of 
130 billion yen (US$591 million), of which 22% was financed by the government, developed state-of-the-
1
 Cooperative R&D can be executed in many forms, including R&D contracts, R&D consortia, and research 
joint ventures. In this analysis, these forms are collectively referred to as R&D consortia or cooperative R&D 
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art semiconductor manufacturing technology. After the project, Japanese semiconductor companies 
gained world leadership. While this project is regarded as a success, it is widely believed that it is only 
one of many successful projects (Okimoto, 1989). The perceived success of VLSI-type projects has 
motivated governments in other countries to emulate "Japanese style" collaboration. Examples in the U.S. 
include the 1984 National Cooperative Research Act, and its successor bill (passed in 1993); SEMATECH 
(Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology) is one cooperative program which was established under 
these bills in the U.S. In Europe, major efforts include the European Strategic Programme for Research 
and Development of Information Technology (ESPRIT) project, the UK Alvey project, and programs 
under the European Research Coordination Agency (EURECA). The Korean government has also 
launched a series of cooperative R&D projects. 
Despite all of these developments, the impact of cooperative R&D has been examined empirically 
by only a few studies and comprehensive research is almost nonexistent. There are many case studies 
(for example, Katz and Ordover, 1990; Fransman, 1990; Murphy, 1991; Ouchi and Bolton, 1988; 
Dunning and Robson, 1988), but most treatments have been based on anecdotal evidence, or on the 
accounts of a few highly publicized cooperative R&D projects. In particular, the evaluation of the effect 
of cooperative R&D on participating firms is examined in only a few studies, including Irwin and Klenow 
(1996), Link, Teece, and Finan (1996), and Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998). While government 
support of cooperative R&D continues,2 there is an increased interest in OECD countries in the evaluation 
of government programs on innovation and technology; this is driven in part by budget stringency and in 
part by a greater concern for accountability and transparency in government actions (OECD, 1997). 
More empirical research on this issue is, therefore, warranted. 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the existing literature. Section 3 presents 
a game-theoretic model which illustrates a learning effect of R&D consortia. Though this model is 
projects, interchangeably. 
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(ATP) which funds collaborative research of the private sector in the U.S. 
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developed with the case of government-sponsored R&D consortia in mind, it also applies to a broader 
class of R&D consortia. Section 4 describes both the econometric specifications and the empirical results. 
An original data set of government-sponsored R&D consortia in Japan which includes 237 consortia 
organized over 34 years is the basis for this analysis. From this data set, a panel data of 267 Japanese 
firms and their participation in R&D consortia is drawn and analyzed. The results show that participation 
in consortia whose members bring diverse technological capabilities increases firms' R&D spending. 
Finally, in section 5, implications are drawn from the findings. 
2. Previous Research 
Past theoretical research on cooperative R&D has focused on three primary motivations for 
cooperation: sharing of fixed costs among R&D participants, realizing economies of scale in R&D, and 
avoiding "wasteful" duplication (Katz, 1986; d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Choi, 1990; Katz and 
Ordover, 1990; Motta, 1992; Suzumura, 1992; Ziss, 1994; Salant and Shaffer, 1998). All three are 
scale-based motives, and they imply that the principal purpose of cooperative R&D is to share costs. This 
literature typically assumes that firms are symmetrical in terms of their capabilities or knowledge, which 
implies that the cooperating firms belong to a single industry. Firms seek to achieve a single R&D 
outcome, and it is implicitly assumed that there is only one efficient way to pursue this outcome. 
Participating firms, therefore, benefit from this efficient, non-duplicative approach. A basis for these 
assumptions is the desire to obtain interesting equilibrium outcomes from the game-theoretic models. A 
result, however, is that this literature only addresses a limited range of cooperative activity. 
In contrast, in the managerial literature, firms in alliances are often recognized to possess 
heterogeneous capabilities, and they may or may not be direct competitors in the product market. The 
resource-based view suggests that a firm can be conceived as a portfolio of core competencies (Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990). Alliances can be viewed as opportunities for one partner to internalize the skills or 
competencies of the other(s) to create next-generation competencies (Hamel, 1991). Firms possess a 
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knowledge base, and this knowledge - particularly technological knowledge - is often "tacit" (Polanyi, 
1958) and not easily diffused across the firm's boundaries. An organizational vehicle, such as an 
alliance, is required to effect this transfer (Kogut, 1988). 
These resource-based propositions imply that a key objective of cooperative R&D is 
complementary knowledge or skill sharing among participants. Complementary knowledge is defined 
here as knowledge stocks that, in combination, yield new and improved R&D results.3 This knowledge 
sharing effect would be greater if participants of R&D consortia come from different industries, 
because those participants would bring more complementary knowledge. 
There are three ways that the diversity of R&D consortia participants affects the R&D 
expenditures of participating firms. The first is the spillover effect of a firm's own R&D on others' 
R&D productivity. Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) argued that the existence of R&D spillovers 
makes it difficult for innovators to capture the full social benefits of their innovative activity, which 
depresses the incentives to conduct R&D. Through R&D cooperation, firms internalize the externality 
created through spillovers, thus restoring the incentive for firms to conduct R&D (Spence, 1984). If 
the original level of spillover is low, and if cooperation in R&D increases spillover rates among 
consortia participants, everything else being equal, cooperation tends to increase R&D expenditures by 
consortia participants (Katz, 1986). The intuition behind this result is that when the spillovers from 
R&D consortia to non-participants are low, and when intensive R&D sharing within the consortia 
increases the effectiveness of R&D, consortia participants are encouraged to conduct more R&D. It is 
typically assumed that the level of spillover is larger within the industry in which the technology 
originates ("home" industry) than between "home" and "distant" industries (Griliches, 1992). It is 
therefore possible that a firm could encounter higher spillovers in an R&D consortia with diverse 
members than it normally would from other consortia members (from diverse industries) without 
3
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the development of fiber-optics communication systems, and the fusing of mechanical and electronics technologies 
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consortia activity; this could result in an increase in the firm's R&D spending. Additionally, Levin and 
Reiss (1988) showed that when own and rival R&D are imperfect substitutes, an increase in spillover 
productivity, which is the extent of the usefulness of knowledge possessed by other firms, causes a 
firm's R&D intensity to rise. If R&D consortia participants are from diverse industries, it is more 
likely that firms have worked on different technological areas and possess different expertise which can 
be complementary to each other's R&D; this could also result in an increase in a firm's R&D spending. 
The second effect of cooperative R&D on the firm's R&D spending is from learning, which is 
defined here as efforts by firms to assimilate and exploit knowledge or information generated by other 
firms. Learning affects the intra-consortium spillover level. The sharing of complementary knowledge 
implies that learning from other participants and from cooperative R&D results is important. Cohen 
and Levinthal (1989) showed that a high spillover rate in R&D among competitors can provide a 
positive incentive to conduct R&D when a company's own R&D increases its learning capability. 
Cooperative R&D is a "forced" spillover scheme. The implication is that the spillover rate among 
consortia participants is likely much higher than would exist without the consortia, with participants 
increasing their R&D efforts in order to learn from others. Levin et al. (1987) point out that 
independent in-house R&D is the most effective means to learn about rivals' technology. It is also 
documented that Japanese companies participating in consortia customarily set up in-house research 
groups to absorb and utilize the results of R&D consortia (Kodama, 1985). This learning effect is 
likely to be large for firms which come from diverse industries.4 
The third effect relates to the impact of R&D cooperation on product market competition. Katz 
(1986) argues that if a higher level of R&D makes market competition more intense by lowering firms' 
marginal cost of production, then the resulting decline in profits will reduce their incentive to conduct 
producing the mechatronics revolution, which has transformed the machine tool industry (Kodama, 1992). 
4
 In the long run, firms which participate in R&D consortia will increase their capabilities to learn from others 
over time, and as a result, firms' R&D spending for learning purposes might decrease. Also, product market 
competition among R&D consortia participants with diverse capabilities might intensify, because learning among 
participants might make their capabilities similar. In this sense, this article is focused on the short-run effect. 
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R&D. Katz showed that R&D consortia can depress R&D as firms seek to lessen the severity of 
competition in the product market. Katz' argument applies to the case of R&D consortia whose 
participants come from a single industry, where expected market competition will be intensified by the 
outcome of cooperative R&D. Participants in R&D consortia who come from diverse industries, 
however, are not necessarily direct rivals in the product market. This market competition effect is, 
therefore, expected to be smaller in this case. Even when participants from different industries enter 
the target product market of the R&D project, these firms possess heterogeneous capabilities, likely 
with products and strategies highly differentiated, with the result that the expected degree of ex-post 
competition will be lower than when consortia participants hold more homogeneous capabilities. 
All three effects suggest the possibility that R&D consortia whose members are from diverse 
industries may increase participants' R&D spending, relative to consortia of single-industry 
participants.5 Among three effects, the learning effect of R&D consortia has not been formalized in the 
theoretical literature. In the following section, we present a model of the learning effect that builds 
upon Cohen and Levinthal (1989). 
3. Model 
3.1. Model Structure 
We model an R&D consortium in which firms share R&D outcomes at a jointly determined rate. 
We compare this case to three others, including one case with no cooperation and two cases with broader 
cooperation. In this model, two firms invest in process R&D, which can reduce marginal production cost, 
denoted c Firms decide individual R&D investment, M, as well as the degree to which they want to 
5
 One might argue that an increase in R&D efficiency by the formation of R&D consortia will affect firms 
differently depending on the composition of R&D consortia. Single-industry consortia can achieve increased 
efficiency through economies of scale and avoidance of wasteful duplications, while consortia participants from 
diverse industries might find efficiencies in the easier acquisition of necessary complementary resources for R&D. 
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share their knowledge with other firms, denoted 9, and defined in detail later6. After R&D is conducted, 
each firm decides what quantity to produce, denoted q, and the firms engage in product market 
competition with homogeneous goods.7 
We assume cost-reducing R&D, in which the marginal production cost of firm i is given as 
c1 = cXz1) 
where z1 is firm i's stock of knowledge, and it is assumed c^ < 0 and c'zizi > 0. Also it is assumed c(0) is 
positive and finite, and c'zi is always finite. Following Spence (1984), if one thinks of the product as the 
services it delivers to the customer, and R&D reduces the cost of delivering services, this cost-reducing 
R&D can be interpreted as product-innovation R&D. 
R&D investment in this model reduces production cost by increasing the stock of knowledge held 
by firms, as proposed by Cohen and Levinthal (1989). We assume firm i's stock of knowledge z1 
increases the firm's gross earnings (i.e. earnings from sales) through cost reduction, IrXz'.z') (i.e.,n'zi > 
0), but at a diminishing rate (i.e., n1^; < 0). Further, z1 is a function of 
z
1
 = j(MlM,&,&) 
where M1 is a firm's own investment in R&D; Mj is the other firm's R&D investment; & is the degree the 
other firm wants to share the knowledge with this firm, and thus, represents the firm's knowledge sharing 
rate or the spillover rate; and the parameter B is the degree of knowledge complementarity or 
technological distance in this model. The functional form of z1 is the following, 
zl = Ml + yi(Mi,P)9iMj 
where y1 is the fraction of competitor's knowledge that the firm is able to assimilate and exploit, and thus 
6
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R&D cooperation, though they assume that some fixed sharing rate is automatically achieved among participants. 
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represents the firm's learning capability or absorptive capacity. It is assumed 0 < y < 1 and 0 < 0 < 1. 
Therefore, firm j ' s R&D investment contributes to firm i's own knowledge stock, though its effect does 
not exceed the effect of firm i's own R&D. It is assumed there is no overlap in firm i and j ' s research, 
and so research investments by both firms additively contribute to each firm's stock of knowledge, 
reflecting a case in which firms possess different expertise. In other words, firms are horizontally 
differentiated in terms of their knowledge. 
A firm's learning capability, y1, depends on two factors. One is its own R&D effort, M1, and the 
other is the complementarity of its knowledge with that of other firms, denoted as p. Knowledge 
complementarity p is defined here as the distance between or the degree of difference in knowledge firms 
possess, p can also be interpreted as the proximity of the firms in technology space, in the manner 
suggested by Jaffe (1986). We assume an R&D consortium which consists of participants from a single 
industry has a very small P, while an R&D consortium which consists of participants from different 
industries has a large p.8 Further, it is assumed 0 < p < 1. We also assume that the firm's own R&D 
increases its own learning capability, yM > 0, though at a constant or decreasing rate, yMM < 0. The more 
complementary or more distant the other firm's knowledge becomes, the more difficult is it for the firm to 
learn (i.e., yp(M1,P) < 0), because firms do not possess the basic knowledge to understand a distant 
technology easily. However, the larger is p, the larger is the marginal impact of own R&D on learning 
capability such that yMp(M\p) > 0, because the contribution of more complementary knowledge to its 
learning is greater than more similar knowledge once it is learned. Therefore, it is assumed that 
increasing p increases the marginal effect of R&D on learning capability, but diminishes the level of 
learning capability.9 Also, when p approaches zero, learning capability is less responsive to the level of 
8
 We assume (3 is exogenously determined by the characteristics of knowledge participants already possess. One 
can argue that (3 might change over time, or might change during cooperation. (3 can also be interpreted as a 
Bayesian conjecture of knowledge complementarity, therefore it is appropriate to assume (3 takes the same value 
throughout the period considered here. 
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own R&D and y1 approaches 1. We also assume the value of yM and yMM is always finite. 
It is assumed there is a cost for knowledge sharing, denoted as s(8), for each firm, which reflects 
opportunity costs for a firm such as costs to assign good researchers to transmit its knowledge to the other 
firm, or costs to keep its own R&D secret from the other firm. It is therefore assumed that s(0)=oo, 
s'(0)=-oo, s(l)=oo, s'(l)=°°, s"(9)>0. This assumption means both complete secrecy and full 
knowledge sharing are extremely costly, because full knowledge sharing requires education of the 
researchers from other firms, while complete secrecy requires the setup of R&D facilities in an isolated 
location and tight information control to and from the research facility.10 The construction of the stock of 
knowledge implies that two conditions are necessary to benefit from R&D by the other firm: the supplying 
firm is willing to share its knowledge, and the receiving firm has to undertake its own R&D to learn 
effectively from the other firm. 
We also assume that an increase in the other firm's knowledge level decreases firm i's gross profit 
and firm i's marginal benefit from increasing its own knowledge level so that n1^ < 0, and n 1 ^ < 0, 
where zj represents a competitor's knowledge level. We assume the effect of a firm's own knowledge 
level on its gross profit is greater than the effect of the knowledge level of the opponent, which implies 
|n'z i | > |rrz j | . In addition to this assumption, we assume n'zi > 1 always holds, which means gross 
profit increases from this R&D investment are always larger than the increase in the stock of knowledge. 
Two three-stage games are considered first. At stage one, firms decide 01 and 02, the knowledge 
sharing rate. At stage two, firms decide M1 and M2, the amount of R&D effort. At stage three the firms 
engage in the product market where Cournot competition is assumed. We consider two cases at stage 
one. The first is a non-cooperative case, in which 61 and 02 are determined independently. The second is 
contribution of very distant knowledge to a firm's learning becomes negative. Here we assume that the condition 
yMp(M',P) > 0 holds for any f3 both in a model and an empirical analysis because we assume a feasible design of 
R&D consortia precludes the case of an R&D consortium which consists of firms with such different capabilities that 
participants cannot learn each other. 
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a cooperative 9 case or an R&D consortium case, in which firms pick the same 6 jointly. We seek a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We only seek symmetric equilibria; the same 6 is chosen as a Nash 
equilibrium in a non-cooperative case, and both firms are restricted to the same 9 in the cooperative 
case.11 
9, determined at stage one, can reflect the number and quality of researchers a firm is willing 
to dedicate to exchange knowledge, or the frequency of meetings among firms, therefore we assume 9 
is observable. Cooperatively determined 9 means there exists some mutual enforcement mechanism to 
maintain the same 9, or cooperative commitment.12 It can be interpreted that, in this model, R&D is 
conducted separately in the research labs of companies, and each company makes decisions in order to 
maximize its own profit. 
Firms face an inverse demand function D !(Q), where Q = q1 + q2 is the total quantity produced. 
Here D"1 is assumed to be linear, so that 
D1 = a - b(q! + q2) 
where q1, q2 are the quantities each firm produces, and a> >0, b>0 . 
After these two cases, the third case is examined in which 9 and M are cooperatively determined. 
Finally, a collusive case is examined in which all the decision variables are cooperatively determined. 
3.2. Analysis 
3.2.1. Non-cooperative case 
In a non-cooperative case, firms choose 9, M, and q independently. Employing the usual 
backward induction, firm i's problem at stage three, given 91, 9s, M1, Mj, p, q1, becomes 
Max f = q1 (D1 - c1) - M1 - s(9j) 
q' 
11
 One might argue that there would be asymmetric equilibria even if firms are symmetric. One justification for 
this assumption is that in a consortium it would be more mutually acceptable and "implementable" for firms to simply 
choose the same 0. 
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 One interpretation is that, if the government is involved in the formation of an R&D consortium, it can enforce a 
certain level of 0 for both parties, because the government can observe the number and quality of the researchers in 
an R&D consortium through their resume or publications, or the number of meetings among consortia participants. 
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. . . . . . . . . 1 . . 
By substituting q1, q* in (1) to q1 (c\d), q1 (c\d), the gross profit function FT = —- (a-2c1(z1) 
9b 
+cj(zj)}2 is obtained. In order for the assumptions of the derivatives of n , n'zizi < 0 and n'zi > 1 to hold, 
we make the following assumptions on the cost function and parameters of the demand function; 
11 
Its solution is a Coumot Nash equilibrium, which is given as 
A numerical example confirms an exponential cost function c = tz satisfies these assumptions with 
properly determined a and b. 
At stage two, firm i picks M1 to maximize its profit, given q'^c'.c'), qi*(c',cj), 61, &, (3, Mj. By 
substituting q1, q1 in (1) to q^c'.d), q^c'.d), firm i's problem is: 
Equation (4) implicitly defines firm i's reaction function M'*(Mj) which gives the profit 
maximizing level of M1 for any given Mj. Nash equilibrium at stage two [MiNC*(91,0j,P), MjNC*(91,8i,|3)] is 
given at the intersection of the two reaction functions ]Vr*(Mj) and Mj*(M1), derived from (4) for both 
firms. The Nash equilibrium is assumed to be stable.14 
At stage one, 61 and 92 are chosen independently. Firm i solves 
It can be easily shown that there is at least one solution 91* which satisfies the first-order condition 
for any & and (3. Reaction functions for both firms are defined from first-order conditions. A Nash 
equilibrium in knowledge sharing [9iNC*(P), 9jNC*(p)] is given at the intersection of the reaction functions 
12 
The first-order condition for a Nash equilibrium by firm i becomes 
At a symmetric equilibrium 6 ^ ( 6 ) = &NC\$) = 9NC*(P), and M ^ B ) = MjNC*(P) = MNC*(P). 
3.2.2. Cooperative 9 case — R&D consortium case 
In the second game, firms choose q and M independently, but choose the same knowledge sharing 
rate 9 jointly. This case is intended to model the situation in which the formation of R&D consortia is 
allowed but firms cannot cooperatively determine their R&D outlays because of antitrust considerations. 
Nash equilibrium at stage three is the same as in the non-cooperative case. At stage two, the first-order 
condition is the same as the previous case except that 91 = 9j = 9, 
13 
91*(9j) and 9i*(91). The Nash equilibrium is assumed to be stable.15 
Substituting Nash equilibrium values of 9iNC*(P) and 9iNC*(P) into (6) gives the noncooperative 
equilibrium profit as a function of knowledge complementarity (3. 
By symmetry, the Nash equilibrium becomes MlC*(9,P) = MjC*(9,P) = Mc*(9,p). Also, yiC* = fc* = yc* 
= Y(MC*,P). 
At stage one, firm i solves 
By using symmetry, the first-order condition becomes, 
A symmetric equilibrium for cooperative 0, given p, is denoted here as 0lC*(p) = BiC*(P) = 0c*(p). 
0C*(P) is a solution of (9). It can be easily shown that there is at least one solution 0C* which satisfies the 
first-order condition for any p. 
It is not clear if 0C*(P), the equilibrium knowledge sharing rate in the cooperative 0 case, is larger 
than 0NC*(p), the equilibrium knowledge sharing rate in the non-cooperative case. However, we can show 
for large P, 0C*(P) > 0NC*(P). 
In the following analysis, it is necessary to establish signs of and 
d2M* 
„„.„ . Exploring these effects analytically is quite complex. Thus, to provide an intuitive sense of the 
ovop 
basic forces at work, we simplify the analysis by considering only the first-order effects of knowledge, z, 
on firm profit, following Cohen and Levinthal (1989). Because we cannot claim the analysis to apply 
generally, we provide a numerical example in Appendix 3 to confirm the intuition developed here. 
Claim 1. For large (3, 0C*(P) > 0NC*(P). 
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
Claim 1 shows that when the knowledge firms possess is highly complementary, and if firms 
commit to share the knowledge at the same rate, the resulting knowledge sharing rate is greater than in the 
case where no such commitment exists. This proof can be explained in a different way from the analysis 
developed above. In the non-cooperative case, when an opponent chooses 0j in the interval we consider, 
firm i's best response is to choose a smaller 0; than its opponent. That is because a larger 0j 
14 
unambiguously increases an opponent's stock of knowledge, and the benefit from an opponent's increased 
stock of knowledge (since some of it spills over to firm i) has only a secondary effect. However, since the 
cost function of 6 is convex, to take a very small value of 0; is extremely costly. Hence firm i will choose 
a value of 0; which is smaller than 0 as the solution of s'(9) = 0, at which the cost of 0 is minimized, 
equating the marginal benefit from taking smaller 0; and the marginal cost of 0;. 
When it is required that the same 0 is chosen, firms find it is mutually beneficial to choose a 
larger 0 than 0NC*. This is because, ceteris paribus, the larger 0 increases the stock of knowledge and 
reduces marginal production costs of both firms, and Cournot competition implies larger profits for both 
firms. Also, since 0NC* < 0 |
 s(e) = 0 , to increase 0 cooperatively decreases the costs of 0, at least until 0 
reaches 0 |
 s(e) = 0. We have shown a numerical example in Appendix 3 with an exponential cost function 
and a linear learning capability function which satisfies 0C* > 0 |
 s(e) = 0. 
Can we draw the opposite conclusion when p is small? It is ambiguous because an approximation 
in a previous proof is less justifiable when p is small, which increases the value of y, and which in turn 
increases the secondary effect of its own knowledge on the profit of the other firm. 
Next, we examine if MC*(P) > MNC*(P) holds or if cooperation in knowledge sharing increases 
private R&D. For this proof, we basically follow Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and determine that the 
cM* 
results depend on whether _^ takes a positive sign or not. 
ou 
Claim 2. For large p, MC*(P) > MNC*(P). 
Proof. See Appendix 2. 
Claim 2 shows that when the knowledge firms posses is highly complementary, and if firms 
commit to share the knowledge at the same rate, the resulting R&D spending level by these firms is higher 
than in the case where no such commitment exists. Why does a cooperatively determined 0 increase the 
R&D investment when p is large? When p is large, or firms possess more complementary knowledge 
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stocks, firms are encouraged to invest in R&D because higher p enhances the positive impact of own 
R&D on the other firm's knowledge that is successfully absorbed. Also, a higher p implies a competitor's 
absorptive capacity level is smaller, therefore it encourages R&D by mitigating the appropriability 
problems of spillovers. A higher p also increases the optimal level of R&D by a competitor as well as the 
first firm, which decreases that firm's profit. However, as long as | IT^| > \Tl\j\ holds, the benefit from 
increased own R&D exceeds the loss from increased competitor's R&D. Therefore a higher p encourages 
R&D investment. 
When 0 becomes large, the pool of industry R&D becomes large, which provides an incentive to 
conduct R&D in order to absorb more knowledge from others. When p is also large, the level of the 
learning capability by a competitor becomes small, which means the disincentive associated with other 
firms' assimilation of the first firm's R&D output becomes small. Therefore a cooperative increase in 9 
increases R&D investment by participating firms, which decreases the marginal production costs of both 
firms, and Cournot competition implies that this increases the profits of both firms. 
This mechanism only works only if firms commit to increase 0 cooperatively. Claim 1 implies 
at 
that when p is large, —— >0 at both 0 are around the Nash equilibrium level. This means a competitor's 
increase in 0 is beneficial for a firm when a firm does not change its own 0, and a firm's increase in 0 is 
beneficial for a competitor. Therefore, there is no incentive for a firm to increase 0 voluntarily. 
As with claim 1, the way this mechanism works when (3 is small is ambiguous. It can be shown 
dM* 
that <0 when p is small. However, it is not clear if firms can have an incentive to decrease 0 
oO 
cooperatively. That is because, from the previous argument, s'(0NC*) < 0; this means the Nash 
equilibrium 0 lies on the downward sloping side of the cost curve of 0. A cooperative decrease in 0 
increases the cost of 0, and it is not clear if the gain from increased R&D investment exceeds the 
increased cost. 
16 
Equilibrium 9 and M satisfy this condition. We cannot specify equilibrium 6 and M using only this 
condition. However, when the impact of R&D on cost reduction is only incremental, i.e., when the 
dc dw 
absolute value of — is not too large, it can be the case that —— is always negative, thus optimum M is 
given as a corner solution, i.e., Mcc* = 0. Given this, optimum 9, denoted 9CC*, is obtained as the 
solution of s'(9) = 0. This result means that when both M and 9 are determined cooperatively, it 
discourages R&D investment when R&D investment has only an incremental impact on cost reduction. In 
other words, competitive pressure forces firms to invest in R&D even if that R&D investment is not very 
profitable. A case with a linear demand function D"1 = 4 - Q, an exponential cost function c = e"z, and a 
16
 Note that the previous assumption requires that n'zi = -(4/9b)(a-c)3c/dz > 1, and therefore, the argument above 
holds in the range 9b/{2(a-c)(l-r-y0+yM0M)} > |3c/dz| > 9b/4(a-c). In order for this inequality to be meaningful, 
y0+yM0M < 1 should hold in equilibrium. Given 0<y<l, 0<9<1 and noting that the value of M depends on the 
scaling, this inequality is not so restrictive. 
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3.2.3. Case of both 9 and M set cooperatively 
The third game is a case in which both the knowledge sharing rate 9 and R&D investment M are 
determined cooperatively. This case becomes a two-stage game where firms conduct Cournot competition 
during the second stage. In the first stage, given P and Cournot quantity, and noting that c'(z') = d(zj) = 
c(z) and z = M+y9M, a firm solves, 
First-order conditions are 
Note s'(9) > 0. From (9) and from (10), we get 
quadratic knowledge sharing cost function s(0) = {1/10 tan7i(0-l/2)}2 satisfies this condition. The result 
is shown in Appendix 3. 
For the case in which R&D investment has a very large impact on cost reduction, the result 
depends on the gain from increased R&D investment and the cost associated with 9CC*, which is larger 
than 0 at s'(0) = 0- In the reduced form it is difficult to specify if equilibrium M increases or not when 
M is determined cooperatively. 
3.2.4. Collusive case 
The forth case is a collusive case, in which quantity, R&D investment, and the knowledge sharing 
rate are all cooperatively determined. Here we focus on a symmetric case in which both firms produce 
and invest the same amount.17 At stage two, collusive quantity is determined. At stage one, given 
monopoly quantity Q = 2q = (a-c)/2b and taking q into consideration, a firm solves, 
The solution is the same as the cooperative 9 and M case, i.e., Mco* = 0; Gco* is given as the solution of 
s'(0) = 0 if this R&D has only incremental impact.18 
3.3. Discussion 
This model shows that the equilibrium knowledge sharing rate and R&D investment are higher in 
the cooperative 0 case than in the non-cooperative case when the knowledge of consortium participants is 
highly complementary. In this case, welfare is higher in the cooperative 0 case, because firm profits and 
consumer surplus are higher given the higher R&D level and the greater cost reduction. Because of this, 
governments have an incentive to promote R&D consortia. On the other hand, if firms have substitutable 
knowledge, the impact of an R&D consortium on welfare becomes ambiguous. Therefore, this model 
17
 One may consider an asymmetric case in which one firm is shut down and all the operation is done by the 
remaining firm. Here we limit our consideration to a symmetric case for a comparison with other cases, and we 
assume such an asymmetric case cannot happen because of capacity constraints and high shutdown costs. 
18 
The analysis in this section is conducted for a duopoly case. The basic results hold for an n-firm case if we 
18 
implies that antitrust law enforcement regarding cooperative R&D has to take the composition and 
knowledge complementarity of participating companies into consideration. Further, this model shows that 
if both the knowledge sharing rate and the level of R&D investment are determined cooperatively, R&D 
investment may be discouraged and consumer surplus may be reduced. In this case, social welfare may 
be lower than in the cooperative 0 case. The same argument applies to the collusive case. 
A numerical example presented in Appendix 3 illustrates the arguments above. In this example, 
the equilibrium knowledge sharing rate is always higher in the R&D consortia case than in the non-
cooperative case. R&D expenditures also become higher in the R&D consortia case when p is larger than 
0.9, and a combined result of those two effects is lower production cost in the R&D consortia case when p 
is larger than 0.75. Since firm profits are always higher in the R&D consortia case than the non-
cooperative case, welfare is higher in the R&D consortia case when (3 is larger than 0.5. The 
government, therefore, has an incentive to promote R&D consortia with high p. In this example, welfare 
in the R&D consortia case is always higher than in the collusive cases. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Econometric specification 
In this section, we test a hypothesis derived from section 2 and the preceding model: 
participation in R&D consortia with diverse participants increases firm R&D spending. The equation 
we seek to estimate is: 
where R&Dit is firm i's R&D expenditures in year t, aj is the individual effect, salesit is firm 
i's sales in year t, participation is a dummy variable which takes 1 on the first and subsequent years of 
seek symmetric equilibria and assume that any pair of firms faces the same (3, the average technological distance. 
Without these assumptions, the effect of consortia on firm R&D in oligopoly would be quite complex. 
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participation in an R&D consortium by firm i, and 0 otherwise, diversity! is the diversity measure of a 
consortium in which firm i participates, government_subsidyit is a government subsidy allocated to firm 
i in year t, and the 8 's are the coefficients on year dummy variables, yeart. A full set of year dummies 
is included to control for macro business cycle effects, general trends of R&D spending, and any 
effects of general technological opportunities. 1981 is used as a reference year.19 Firm sales is 
included as a control, and government subsidy is included to test if subsidies work as a complement or 
a substitute of firm R&D. 
One of the key variables in the estimated equation is diversity;, the degree of heterogeneity 
among consortia participants' technological capabilities, denoted p in the previous section. To 
calculate diversity, two methods are employed: one focuses on the diversity of participating firms' core 
businesses, and the other focuses on the technological diversity of participating firms. 
Two measures of the diversity of participating firms' core businesses in each R&D consortium 
are used. It is assumed that the degree of heterogeneity of knowledge stocks is greater between 
industries than within an industry. In other words, R&D consortia members from more diverse 
industries are assumed to bring less overlapping and potentially more complementary knowledge. This 
measure requires the assumption that the firm's core technology resides in its main line of business. 
The use of "heterogeneity in industry background" as a proxy for diversity is a potential source 
of measurement error. Some industries might consist of diverse groups of firms whose capabilities are 
highly differentiated, while firms in different industries may have similar skills. The technological 
"closeness" of industries, however, is reflected in the SIC classification, and one could argue that this 
is what the SIC classification is for (Griliches, 1992), and that the use of this proxy is justified. 
The diversity measures of participants' core businesses we use here are drawn from the 
diversification literature. In this analysis, the diversity measures used in Montgomery (1982) and 
19
 Because the natural log of zero is not identified, R&D, sales, government budget variables are transformed by 
adding 1 to all observations and taking the log of this sum. This transformation is standard in the R&D literature. 
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Palepu (1985) are calculated for each R&D consortium by using the 3-digit SIC codes of the 
participating firms' main businesses. These measures are Montgomery's 3-digit product count 
measures, and Palepu's total entropy measures. The details of the diversity measures' calculation and 
the method of main business identification are explained in Appendix 4. When all the participants are 
classified in the same 3-digit industry, both Montgomery and Palepu measures become zero. The 
maximum value Montgomery measures can take is one, while Palepu measures can exceed one. 
The technological diversity of participating firms is measured as the average technological 
distance of participating firms in a consortium. This calculation is based on each firm's patent portfolio 
in fifty distinct technology fields. For each pair of firms in a consortium, the technological proximity 
is calculated by measuring the degree of similarity in their patent portfolios, and the average of the 
technological proximity for all the pairs in a consortium is a basis of the consortium's measure of 
technological diversity. The details of the calculation are explained in Appendix 5. 
Though technological diversity is a better measure than diversity of participating firms' core 
businesses as a proxy for the diversity of technological expertise of consortia participants, the 
calculation requires us to identify the patent portfolio of all the participants in a consortium. This is a 
very time consuming process, and so in this analysis this calculation is conducted for 75% of the 
consortia in the sample, reducing the number of observations.20 Also, the patent portfolio of all the 
participants in a consortium are not necessary identified. In this analysis, the medium coverage per 
consortium is 67%. Firms which are not included are typically small, unlisted firms. Because of these 
limitations, three diversity measures are used for this analysis to compensate for measurement error and 
to obtain robust estimates. 
4.2. Data 
The technological diversity is calculated for 55 of the 73 consortia in the sample. There are 213 firms for the 
analysis with the technological diversity measure, which include 123 consortia participants and 100 consortia non-
participants. 
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The empirical analysis of this article focuses on R&D consortia in Japan that were sponsored 
by government organizations. This form of cooperative R&D is chosen because these ventures are 
most frequently cited as being important to industry competitiveness, particularly among Western 
observers. In addition, comprehensive and detailed data are available for this type of R&D consortia. 
Government-sponsored R&D consortia include all significant company-to-company cooperative 
R&D projects formed with a degree of government involvement. The nature of government 
involvement in R&D consortia varies. The government can have significant influence on the formation 
of consortia, including input in the type of participants who will be involved and the directions research 
will take. One means by which the government wields this influence is through subsidies to the 
consortia that meet established criteria. In this article, a principal criterion used to identify 
government-sponsored R&D consortia is that the projects of the R&D consortia involved cooperation 
among private companies. Projects which were primarily government procurement, and those in which 
government agencies simply allocated tasks without the private sector's initiative, were excluded. 
Projects which were essentially the implementation of existing technology were also excluded.21 
A large number of government sponsored R&D consortia occurred between 1959 and 1992, of 
which 237 were included in the data set. 1171 companies participated in these consortia during this 
period, and many were involved in multiple projects. Inclusion of these multiple projects yields a data 
set with 3021 company-project pairs. This data set was collected from each ministry through direct 
contacts after examining a wide range of government white papers and other government publications, 
and is as close as possible to an exhaustive list of all the government sponsored R&D consortia in Japan 
during this time period. This data set was matched with the set of all first section Tokyo Stock 
Exchange firms whose R&D expenditures and sales figures are reported in the Japan Development 
Bank Financial Database (JDB). This matching process and the criteria explained below determined 
the number of observations included in this analysis. 
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The sample for this empirical analysis consists of 267 firms which can be categorized in one of 
two sets: consortia participants and "matching" consortia non-participants. For consortia participants, 
the empirical analysis concentrates on the first cooperative R&D project in which a particular firm 
participated. This criterion allows us to isolate the effect of a single project on a given participating 
firm. This set includes 155 consortia participants which reported their R&D expenditures for at least 
six consecutive years including the first year of consortia participation and one year before and after the 
first year. The maximum window of observation per firm is 13 years, which includes six years before 
the participation, the first year of the participation, and six years after the first participation. This 6-
year "before" and "after" observation period is chosen because the average interval between the first 
consortia participation and the second consortia participation is at least 6.2 years for the sample firms, 
thus this window allows us to isolate the effect of the first project. The average duration of the R&D 
consortia in the sample is 6.8 years, and so this 6 year "after" observation period should allow us to 
evaluate the total effect of the participation. Alternative to 13 years, an 11-year window is also tested. 
For each consortium participant, a matching consortia non-participant is selected from the same 
SIC 3-digit industries with the same years of observation as the matched firm. Matching non-
participants are included in the analysis in order to control for any bias which might arise from the 
characteristics of industries to which participants belong. Alternatively, a subsample of consortia 
participants are tested. The matching process might sound arbitrary. Only a limited number of 
potential matching firms report R&D expenditures consecutively for 6 years or longer, and so in most 
cases there is no room to arbitrarily choose matching firms from a limited pool. When several firms 
are available as matching firms, the one most similar in size is chosen as a match. This matching 
process yields 112 matching firms. 
For each consortia participant, the government contribution per firm is calculated by dividing 
the yearly government subsidy to a consortium by the number of participants in the consortium. Only 
21
 For a detailed explanation of government-sponsored R&D consortia in Japan, see Sakakibara (1997b). 
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the total government subsidy per consortium is available, and so it is assumed the subsidy is allocated 
uniformly over the entire project period. For a given firm, when a government subsidy from the 
second project in which a firm participates exceeds that of the first project, that year is dropped from 
the observation. From this procedure, an unbalanced panel data of 267 firms is obtained. The 
observation period per firm ranges from 6 to 13 years.22 All financial data are real annual figures 
deflated to the base year 1985 using Japanese GDP deflators. 
The firms in the sample represent 75 different 3-digit SIC industries; 73 different cooperative 
R&D projects are covered. The first year the sample firms participated in the cooperative R&D 
projects ranges from 1971 to 1990. The total period covered in this analysis is between 1969 and 
1994. Table 1 and 2 report the summary statistics and a correlation matrix of the data. 
Table 1 and 2 about here 
4.3. Results 
To test the hypothesis regarding the association between the participation in R&D consortia and 
firm R&D spending, we focus on relative differences in R&D spending between the non-cooperative 
R&D period and the R&D consortia participation period. We use ordinary least squares regression 
analyses with fixed effects. The fixed effect model assumes that differences across firms (difference in 
propensities of R&D spending across firms in this analysis) can be captured in the constant term. 
Operationally, we define transformations of our variables such that, for each firm in each year, we 
subtract the mean of the variable for that firm over time.23 
The fixed effect model allows us to emphasize the time-series or evolutionary dimension of the 
data24, because all the industry-specific effects, and the unmeasured firm-specific effects which might 
22
 This variation also comes from the missing R&D reporting of some sample firms. 
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 For an example of the fixed effect model to measure determinants of firm-level R&D, see Branstetter and 
Sakakibara (1998). For an use of the fixed effect model to evaluate the effects of different regulatory periods, see 
Kole and Lehn (1996). 
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 A cost of this technique is that standard goodness-of-fit measures are uninformative. We report adjusted R2 
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have been included in the error term fall out in the process of the transformation of the variables, since 
they do not vary "within firms" over time. This methodology, therefore, is appropriate in this analysis 
because it allows us to focus on changes in R&D under two different periods, the R&D consortia non-
participation period and the consortia participation period. Moreover, this methodology has a clear 
advantage when dealing with Japanese firm-level R&D data. Many researchers (for example, Griliches 
and Mairesse 1990) noted the poor and inconsistent reporting of R&D figures across Japanese firms. 
This is partly because the coverage of R&D figures of Japanese firms is less standardized than that of 
the U.S. Process R&D performed on the factory floor, for instance, might or might not be included as 
R&D spending for some firms, though this is an important R&D activity by Japanese firms. This 
inconsistency across firms becomes a major source of noise for a cross-section analysis. The fixed 
effect approach, however, should be valid even if there are large differences in R&D reporting 
standards across firms, as long as firms are consistent in their reporting policies over time. Japanese 
CPAs have noted that for a given firm, the coverage of R&D figures is consistent over time, supporting 
the validity of this methodology. 
Table 3 about here 
Table 3 reports estimation results. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
computed by using the formulas suggested by White (1980). Regression (1) is the base case, in which 
only a dummy variable of consortia participation is included without controlling for the diversity of 
consortia. The coefficient of the participation dummy variable is positive and significant at the 1 % 
level, indicating that, all else being equal, participation in an R&D consortium on average increases 
firm R&D spending by 23 %. In this specification, the coefficient of the log of per-firm government 
subsidy is negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating a negative impact of government subsidy 
on firm R&D spending. The magnitude of this substitution effect, however, is small. A 100% increase 
values to provide information on the relative fit of variants of a single model. 
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in the per-firm government subsidy decreases firm R&D expenditures by only 3.6%. 
Regressions (2) through (4) include an interaction term in which the participation dummy is 
multiplied by one of the consortia diversity measures to evaluate the marginal effect of the diversity of 
the consortia. In regression (2), the Montgomery diversity measure is used. The coefficient of the 
participation dummy is negative and significant at the 1% level, and the interaction term is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. This result implies that when a firm participates in a consortium in which 
all the participants come from a single industry, all else being equal, annual firm R&D expenditures 
decrease by 34%; this implies that the cost-sharing consortia economize substantially on firm R&D 
spending. When the diversity measure increases by 10%, however, firm R&D expenditures increase 
by 7%. This implies that for firms which participate in highly diversified consortia, with the diversity 
measure equal to one, this knowledge-sharing effect increases firm R&D expenditures by 72%, and the 
total effect of the participation in highly diversified consortia is to increase firm R&D expenditures by 
38% (i.e. the sum of -34% by the participation effect and 72% by the knowledge-sharing effect). In 
this specification, the coefficient of the log of per-firm government subsidy is, again, negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, and the 100% increase in the per-firm government subsidy 
decreases firm R&D expenditures by only 3.6%. 
Another way of interpreting these results is that, when a firm participates in an average R&D 
consortium25, the participation itself decreases the firm's R&D expenditures by 34%, the diversity or 
knowledge-sharing effect increases R&D expenditures by 57%, and the government subsidy effect 
decreases R&D expenditures by 11 %. The sum of these three effects is a 13% increase in the average 
firm's R&D expenditures. Regression (3), with Palepu entropy diversity measure, yields qualitatively 
similar results, with a slightly worse goodness-of-fit. The sum of the three effects of the participation 
25
 The mean of government subsidies in this sample is 54.3 million yen, with the log transformation by adding 
one yielding 2.93. The mean of Montgomery measure of the sample is 0.8. 
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in an average consortium, as mentioned above, is also a 13% increase in R&D spending.26 
Regression (4), with the technological diversity measure, yields qualitatively similar results, 
confirming the robustness of the findings. In this specification, the coefficient of the participation 
dummy is not significant, though it is negative. Again, the coefficient of the interaction term of the 
participation dummy and the diversity measure is positive and significant at the 1 % level, indicating 
that when the diversity measure increases by 10%, firm R&D expenditures increase by 4.3%. The 
sum of the three effects of the participation in an average consortium with this specification is a 10% 
increase in R&D spending.27 
Regressions (5) through (7) are cases in which the project scale is controlled. The project scale 
is measured as the project budget (including government subsidy) per firm per year. Since this variable 
is highly correlated with the government subsidy variable, the results should be interpreted with 
caution. The basic results hold for all the specifications, with the major difference from regressions (2) 
through (4) being the significance of the government subsidy variable. 
Table 4 about here 
In order to test the robustness of the results obtained from fixed effect models, two alternative 
methodologies are tested. First, since a firm's negative R&D spending is not observed (i.e. R&D data 
is left-censored), Tobit models are used to address this issue.28 Second, fixed effect models assume that 
the company-specific intercepts do not have a distribution, while random effect models assume that the 
intercepts are drawn from a common distribution. Table 4 reports results of Tobit and random effect 
estimations. Both estimates yield coefficients of our focus with almost the same magnitude and 
26
 A subsample of balanced panel data, and a subsumple of consortia participants were tested and yielded 
qualitatively similar results. 
Also, variants of regressions (2) through (4) are tested in which 11-year observation periods, five years 
before the participation, the year of the first participation, and five years after the participation are used. These 
regressions yield qualitatively similar results to regressions (2) through (4). 
28
 Tobit estimates for panel data are not readily available in the statistical software used in this analysis. 
Operationally, therefore, Tobit estimates were conducted by including a full set of company dummies. 
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significance as those from fixed effect estimates, supporting the robustness of the results.29 
5. Conclusions 
This article examines the effects of knowledge sharing or endogenous spillovers among R&D 
consortia participants on R&D competition when R&D enhances a firm's absorptive capacity. A game-
theoretic model illustrates how different compositions of R&D consortia affect spillovers and R&D 
spending of participants. When a firm participates in a consortium whose members are from diverse 
industries, the model suggests that this participation increases spillover rates among participants and 
intensifies firms' R&D efforts to learn from other members in the consortium. An econometric 
analysis based on the panel data of 267 Japanese firms over 13 years shows evidence of this learning 
effect. This finding is consistent with Sakakibara (1997a), which is based on survey data. In addition, 
this analysis finds that government subsidies to consortia are likely to decrease the R&D spending of 
participating firms, though the magnitude is found to be small. 
The results of this article shed light on conflicting findings by previous literature. Irwin and 
Klenow (1996) found that SEMATECH reduced the semiconductor industry's R&D spending by 9%, 
while Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998) found that, on average, if a firm participates in an additional 
Japanese government-sponsored R&D consortium, it will raise its total annual R&D spending by about 
2%. SEMATECH is a consortium in which a narrow set of industries (semiconductor makers and 
fabrication equipment makers) participate, and so the implied diversity measure should will be very 
small; in this consortium, the cost-sharing effect among participants - which reduces firm R&D 
spending - dominates. An average Japanese government-sponsored R&D consortium consists of firms 
from much more diverse industries; in these consortia, the knowledge-sharing effect illustrated in this 
article dominates. 
29
 It is confirmed that a Hausman test cannot reject the equivalence of random effects and fixed effects models 
at the 5% level. 
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In this article, the magnitude of the effect of the participation in an R&D consortium on firm 
R&D expenditures is found to be between 10% and 13%, on average. This effect is much larger than 
the 2% found by Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998). Their observation period is from 1983 to 1989. 
In contrast, this analysis covers the period from 1969 to 1994, including a much earlier period. One 
possible interpretation of the difference of these results is that the first participation in an R&D 
consortium, which is the focus of this analysis, has the greatest impact. After a firm repeatedly 
participates in R&D consortia, the marginal effect of participation diminishes because firms increase 
their capabilities to learn from others. 
This article also indicates that government subsidies work as a substitute to firm R&D, though 
the magnitude of this effect is small. In contrast, Sakakibara (1997b) found from survey data that, on 
average, firms increased their R&D investment by 38% in the area related to the government-
sponsored R&D consortia compared with the hypothetical case that they did not participate in R&D 
consortia. Taken together, perhaps firms which participate in R&D consortia might allocate more 
internal funding to technological areas supported by government-sponsored R&D consortia. The total 
effect of the participation of R&D consortia on R&D spending, of course, depends on the knowledge 
sharing effect. 
This article has an important implication for public policy. If the purpose of promoting R&D 
consortia is to stimulate R&D competition, governments should take the organization of R&D consortia 
into account when deciding on the types of R&D consortia they want to promote. The membership of 
an R&D consortium can be a key determinant of whether the consortium contributes to the increase of 
private R&D efforts or not. 
There are limitations to this analysis. First, the R&D activities of many firms in the sample are 
diversified, and so ideally the dependent variable in the empirical analysis should be R&D spending 
which is closely related with consortia activities. In this article, we use firm level R&D spending 
which includes spending on all types of R&D. Though this aggregation problem is a source of 
29 
measurement error, it is not possible to obtain more disaggregated firm R&D data at this time. 
Also, though this analysis suggests an increase in R&D spending for participants in consortia 
with heterogeneous members, the productivity of such consortia is not yet examined. This is an issue 
which should be explored in future research in this area. 
More research on cooperative R&D is necessary and should be encouraged. This article 
suggests R&D consortia with different organizations can provide different impacts on participating 
firms. A future direction for this line of research includes more analyses at the project level, including 
the outcomes of the projects and determinants of these outcomes. Rigorous evaluations of one of the 
most prominent Japanese industrial policies will provide useful lessons to other countries which seek to 
emulate this Japanese practice. 
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Appendix 1. Proof of Claim 1 
From (7) and by definition of a symmetric Nash equilibrium, firm i's net profit becomes 
By choosing 0 cooperatively, firms can perform at least as well as in the non-cooperative case, 
By adding these two inequalities, we get 
Which implies that 
» by considering only the first-order effects of z on a firm's 
profit. 
M1* is defined as a solution of (12), given other variables. Differentiating (12) with respect to 01, 
To check the numerator, differentiating 
If we focus only on first-order effects of z on profit, n^y , this equation is negative. Therefore 
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From (5), .,2 is always negative. To check the numerator, differentiating (12) with respect to &, 
CM 
If we focus only on first-order effects of z on profit, irziy1MiMJ, this equation is positive. Therefore 
cM'* dMj* 
r = r > 0 . 
d0] d& 
From the construction of z1 = M1 + yYM'.P) & Mj, the change of & on z1 comes from two 
sources; one is through the change of its own investment M1, and the other is through the change of an 
opponent's investment Mj, multiplied by its own learning capability y1 and an opponent's knowledge 
sharing rate &. Here we only consider the case in the interval & e (0NC,9C). From the assumption on the 
cost function of 0, s(l) = oo, 0s in this interval takes a value which is smaller than 1. Also, when p is 
large, from assumptions of yp < 0 and 0 < y < 1, y takes a value which is much smaller than 1. 
Therefore, the effect of the change of an opponent's investment on z1 is dampened, and so we can 
dz' cM* dzj 
approximate that ——— = • . The same logic applies to ——— , and so we can approximate that 
dO oO dO 
This is positive by the assumption that n1^ > 1. We can therefore conclude that —— > 0 at 01 = 0 , & 
E (0NC*,0C*) which implies 0C*(P) > 0NC*(P). 
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Appendix 2. Proof of Claim 2 
cM* 
From Claim 1, as a proof of Claim 2 it suffices to show > 0 for large P, where M* is the 
o6 
equilibrium value of each firm's R&D for a given 9 (which is determined either cooperatively or non-
cooperatively). For this proof, we follow Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and Dixit (1986). 
Differentiating firm i's gross earnings n1 with respect to M1 yields, 
The function R is the marginal return to a firm's own R&D. Deriving this expression for each firm and 
setting it equal to one (the per unit cost of R&D) generates a set of equations characterizing the firm's 
optimal R&D policy given its competitor's R&D level. When solved simultaneously, these equations 
yield M*. 
In the context of symmetric equilibrium in duopoly, we can show that for any arbitrary 
SM* 
parameter, k, that influences M*, the sign of equals the sign of Rk. 
ac 
Consider the first-order condition at the equilibrium values of M: 
Totally differentiating the first-order condition yields 
in matrix form the total derivative for all firms: 
Using this notation, we can represent 
Assuming we have a symmetric equilibrium, we can rewrite this as 
This is simply two identical equations of the form 
Therefore, 
The myopic adjustment process, where each firm increases its output if it perceives positive marginal 
profit from this action, is defined by the differential equations, 
where S;>0 are the adjustment speeds. 
Linearizing around the equilibrium point M*=(M1*, M2*), we have: 
For stability, the coefficient matrix should have eigenvalues with negative real parts. This is so if 
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This sign is ambiguous. This ambiguity is due to two offsetting effects: the benefit to the firm of 
increasing its absorptive capacity, represented by Tl'zjyMM , and the loss associated with the diminished 
appropriability of rents as spillovers increase, represented by yn!zj . However, this equation suggests 
that the positive impact of 0 is typically greater for larger values of p (the impact of own R&D on 
absorptive capacity). To evaluate this effect, it is necessary to evaluate the cross-partial derivative, 
Appendix 3. Numerical example 
Figure 1. Equilibrium knowledge sharing rate (spillover rate) 
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Figure 2. R&D expenditure 
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Appendix 3. (cont.) 
Figure 3. Marginal production cost 
Figure 4. Profit 
Appendix 3. (cont.) 
Figure 5. Welfare 
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Appendix 4. Diversity measure: diversity of participating firms' main businesses 
Identification of firms' main businesses 
In order to obtain an objective measure to identify the primary industry of participating firms, we 
used Kaisha Kigyo Meikan (Company Almanac) edited by the Statistics Bureau of the Management and 
Coordination Agency, Japan. This source is a list of companies that are covered by the Census of 
Establishments, an official census by the Japanese Government. In the Company Almanac, each company 
reports the SIC three-digit level industry codes to which its establishments belong. We used the SIC code 
the firm reported as the primary industry for its headquarters to identify each company's main business. 
When the firm reports the function of headquarters (such as wholesaling) instead of the industry, we used 
the industry to which the largest factory of the firm was assigned as the primary industry. Many 
companies have been assigned to different industries at different times as they change their primary 
industries. We used the SIC code of a firm at the time the firm joined the project. We used 1963 data for 
the analysis of the data in the 1960s and earlier, 1972 data for the 1970s, and 1986 data for the 1980s, due 
to the availability of the source. 
Calculation of diversity measures 
Montgomery product count measures 
nij = the share of firms that are in industry segment j ; where j is measured at the 3-digit SIC 
code. 
Palepu entropy measures 
Total diversity 
P; = the share of firms in the ith industry at the 3-digit SIC level 
n = the number of SIC industries at the 3-digit level 
For the calculation, it is assumed that each firm has an equal share in an R&D consortium. 
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Appendix 5. Diversity measure: technological diversity 
The framework for this calculation was pioneered by Jaffe (1986) and modified by Branstetter 
(1996a,b) and Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998). 
The typical firm conducts R&D in a number of technological fields simultaneously. We could 
obtain a measure of a firm's location in "technology space" by measuring the distribution of its R&D 
effort across various technological fields. Let a firm's R&D program be described by the vector F, 
where 
and each of the k elements of F represent the firm's research resources and expertise in the kth 
technological area. We can infer from the number of patents granted to a firm in different 
technological areas the distribution of a firm's R&D investment and technological expertise across 
different technical fields. In other words, by counting the number of patents held by a firm in a 
narrowly defined technological field, we can obtain a quantitative measure of the firm's level of 
technological expertise in that field. Fifty distinct technological fields are used for the calculation. 
We can measure the "technological proximity" between two firms by measuring the degree of 
similarity in their patent portfolios. Firms working on the same technologies will tend to patent in the 
same technological areas. We can state this more precisely: the "distance" in "technology space" 
between two firms i and j can be approximated by Tij where Tij is the uncentered correlation coefficient 
of the F vectors of the two firms, or 
We calculated F vectors from the data of U.S. patents granted to Japanese consortia participants. 
When Japanese firms file patent applications to the U.S. patent office, they tend to be selective because of 
relatively higher U.S. patent agent fees and translation fees, and so they tend to file only applications for 
promising inventions. The U.S. patent data, therefore, can be viewed as a quality-adjusted measure of 
technological expertise for Japanese firms, and so the use of U.S. patent data has an advantage over the 
use of Japanese patent data. Operationally, U.S. patent data is less costly to obtain than Japanese patent 
data. 
Ty can be calculated for each firm pair in a given consortium. For each consortia, we can 
calculate the average technological proximity of participants in consortium m, TPm, as 
1 
TPm = the sum of Ttj for all pairs / the number of pairs: — n{n — 1) 
where n is a number of participants in consortium m. Note 0 < TPm < 1, and the larger the number, the 
closer firms are to each other in the technology field. This measure is calculated from 1980 and 1996 
and averaged. In order to make this measure comparable to other diversity measures, we calculate 
consortium m's technological diversity measure TDm as 
TD = 1- TP 
which is an average technological distance among participants in consortium m. The larger the 
number, the more diverse the participating firms in a consortium in the technology field, with 0 < TDm 
< 1 . 
42 
References 
Arrow, K.J. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention." In R.R. Nelson ed., The 
Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1962, pp. 609 - 626. 
d'Aspremont, C. and Jacquemin, A. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with 
Spillovers." American Economic Review, Vol. 78 (1988), pp. 1133 - 1137. 
Branstetter, L. "Are Knowledge Spillovers Intranational or International in Scope: Microeconometric 
Evidence from the United States and Japan." NBER Working Paper (1996a). 
Branstetter, L. Innovation, Knowledge Spillovers, and Dynamic Comparative Advantage: Evidence from 
Japan and the United States. Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1996b. 
Branstetter, L. and Sakakibara, M. "Japanese Research Consortia: A Microeconometric Analysis of 
Industrial Policy." Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 46 (1998), pp. 207 - 233. 
Choi, J.P. Essays in the Theory of Dynamic R&D Competition. Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1990. 
Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A. "Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D." Economic 
Journal, Vol. 99 (1989), pp. 569 - 610. 
Dixit, A. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly." International Economic Review, Vol 27 (1986), pp 107 -
122. 
Dunning, J.H. and Robson, P. eds. Multinationals and the European Community. Basil Blackwell, New 
York, 1988. 
Fransman, M. The Market and Beyond: Cooperation and Competition in Information Technology 
Development in the Japanese System. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1990. 
Griliches, Z. "The Search for R&D Spillovers." Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 94 (1992), pp. 
29 - 47. 
Griliches, Z. and Mairesse, J. "R&D and Productivity Growth: Comparing Japanese and U.S. 
Manufacturing Firms." In C.R. Hulten ed., Productivity Growth in Japan and the United States. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990, pp. 317 - 348. 
Hamel, G. "Competition for Competence and Inter-Partner Learning within International Strategic 
Alliances." Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12 (1991), pp. 83 - 103. 
Irwin, D. and Klenow, P. "High Tech R&D Subsidies: The Effects of Sematech." Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 40 (1996), pp. 323 - 344. 
Jaffe, A.B. "Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms' Patents, Profits, 
and Market Value." American Economic Review, Vol. 76 (1986), pp. 984 -1001. 
Kamien, M.I., Muller, E., and Zang, I. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels." American 
43 
Economic Review, Vol. 82 (1992), pp. 1293 - 1306. 
Katz, M.L. "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development." RAND Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 17 (1986), pp. 527-543. 
Katz, M.L. and Ordover, J.A. "R&D cooperation and competition." Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity: Microeconomics (1990), pp. 137 - 203. 
Kodama, F. "Direct and Indirect Channels for Transforming Scientific Knowledge into Technical 
Innovations." In B. Bartocha and S. Okamura, eds., Transforming Scientific Ideas into 
Innovations: Science Policy in the United States and Japan. Japan Society for the Promotion of 
Science, Tokyo, 1985. 
Kodama, F. "Technology Fusion and the New R&D." Harvard Business Review, Vol. 70 (1992), pp. 70 -
78. 
Kogut, B. "Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives." Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 
9 (1988), pp. 319-332. 
Kole, S.R. and Lehn, K. "Deregulation and the Adaptation of Governance Structure: The Case of the 
U.S. Airline Industry." Working paper, University of Rochester, 1996. 
Levin, R.C., Klevorick, A.K., Nelson, R.R., and Winter S.G. "Appropriating the Returns from 
Industrial Research and Development." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 3 (1987), 
pp. 783 - 820. 
Levin, R.C. and Reiss, P.C. "Cost-reducing and Demand-creating R&D with Spillovers." RAND Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 19 (1988), pp. 538 - 556. 
Link, A. N., Teece, D.J., and Finan, W. F. "Estimating the Benefits from Collaboration: The Case of 
Sematech." Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 11 (1996), pp. 737 - 751. 
Montgomery, C.A. "The Measurement of Firm Diversification: Some New Empirical Evidence." 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 25 (1982), pp. 299 - 307. 
Motta, M. "Cooperative R&D and Vertical Product Differentiation." International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, Vol. 10 (1992), pp. 643 - 661. 
Murphy, W.J. R&D Cooperation among Marketplace Competitors. Quorum Books, Westpoint, 
Connecticut, 1991. 
Nelson, R.R. "The Simple Economics of Basic Research." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 67 (1959), 
pp. 297 - 306. 
OECD. Policy Evaluation in Innovation and Technology: Towards Best Practices. OECD, Paris, 1997. 
Okimoto, D.I. Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology. Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 1989. 
44 
Ouchi, W.G. and Bolton, M.K. "The Logic of Joint Research and Development." California Management 
Review, Vol. 30 (1988), pp. 9 - 33. 
Palepu, K. "Diversification Strategy, Profit Performance and the Entropy Measure." Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 6 (1985), pp. 239 - 255. 
Polanyi, M. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1958. 
Poyago-Thetoky, J. "Equilibrium and Optimal Size of a Research Joint Venture in an Oligopoly with 
Spillovers." Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 43 (1995), pp. 209 - 226. 
Prahalad, C.K. and Hamel, G. "The Core Competence and the Corporation." Harvard Business Review, 
Vol. 68(1990), pp. 71 -91 . 
Sakakibara, M. "Heterogeneity of Firm Capabilities and Cooperative Research and Development: An 
Empirical Examination of Motives." Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 18 (1997a), pp. 143 -
164. 
Sakakibara, M. "Evaluating Government-sponsored R&D Consortia in Japan: Who Benefits and How?" 
Research Policy, Vol. 26 (1997b), pp. 447 - 473. 
Salant, S.W. and Shaffer, G. "Optimal Asymmetric Strategies in Research Joint Ventures." International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 16 (1998), pp. 195 - 208. 
Spence, M. "Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance." Econometrica, Vol. 52 (1984), 
pp. 101 - 121. 
Steurs, G. "Inter-industry R&D Spillovers: What Difference Do They Make?" International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, Vol. 13 (1995), pp. 249 - 276. 
Suzumura, K. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with Spillovers." American 
Economic Review, Vol. 82 (1992), pp. 1307 - 1320. 
Vonortas, N.S. "Inter-firm Cooperation with Imperfectly Appropriable Research." International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 12 (1994), pp. 413 - 435. 
White, H. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix and a Direct Test for 
Heteroskedasticity." Econometrica, Vol. 48 (1980), pp. 817 - 838. 
Ziss, S. "Strategic R&D with Spillovers, Collusion and Welfare." Journal of Industrial Economics, 
Vol. 42(1994), pp. 375-393. 
45 
